who was concerned that if his government signed a definitive agreement for the Bomarc, it would undermine Green's and thus Canada's credibility at the UN. Despite the title's suggestion that Diefenbaker's nuclear policy was based on indecision, McMahon argues that Diefenbaker strongly supported Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons.
She emphasizes that his government's hesitation was prompted by political concerns rather than doubts about the value of nuclear weapons as a defense mechanism for Canada. 18 For her, 'the essence of indecision' thus refers to the perception that Diefenbaker was indecisive and her argument ultimately attempts to clarify this as a misconception.
19
To support her argument, she chronologically examines Diefenbaker's nuclear policy beginning with a brief discussion of how he won his 1958 majority government. 20 and presents the thesis of the book as an examination of how Canada became 'trapped' in the reactionary mindset that ultimately shaped Canadian nuclear policy. 33 Fergusson divides his analysis into five chronologically organized 'acts.' Due to the broad time range covered in the book, only the first act of the work is relevant to this paper's discussion. The first act, titled "Anti- stating: "President Eisenhower and I were from our first meeting on an 'Ike-John' basis, and that we were as close as the nearest telephone." 41 Their friendship also influenced the officials around them and prompted the U.S. Secretary to thank George Pearkes, the Canadian Minister of National Defense, for his unique co-operation on matters of defense, a gesture that would be unheard of during Kennedy's presidency. 42 It was in this amicable context that cabinet approved the acquisition of two Bomarc batteries in August 1958. 43 In a show of further goodwill, the U.S. Department of Defense allowed Canadian companies to construct the two batteries and offered to pay two-thirds of the production cost, although the U.S. would maintain ownership of the missiles. 44 both parties left the meeting disillusioned. 56 Whereas Kennedy believed that Diefenbaker had concretely promised to accept the Bomarc, Diefenbaker left the meeting certain that Kennedy would not pressure him to accept nuclear weapons. 57 By Kennedy's visit to Ottawa in May 1961 the disillusionment of both parties had disappeared. 58 In contrast to the amicable nature of Eisenhower's first visit to Canada in both public and private, the Kennedy visit was popular with the Canadian public. 59 Privately, it is evident in the memorandum of their conversation that Kennedy was quite frustrated with his Canadian counterpart. During the meeting, Diefenbaker attempted to justify his reluctance to acquire the Bomarc on the basis of rising public opposition to a nuclear commitment. 60 Rather than soothe his fears as Eisenhower had in the past, Kennedy downplayed and even mocked his concerns, implying that his fears were irrational and suggesting that Canadians who opposed nuclear weapons also defended Chinese communists. 61 Whereas after Eisenhower's first visit to Canada, the leaders' friendship marked Canada and the U.S. as indispensible Cold War allies, at the end Kennedy's visit the leaders only seemed to agree upon the fact that the American public was more militant than its Canadian counterpart.
62
Kennedy further muddied the waters in the fall of 1962 when his administration did not refute the Montreal Gazette headline "JFK Presses Canada on Nuclear Warheads," which exposed the previously secret negotiations to the Canadian public. 63 The refusal of the Kennedy government to deny the headline for the sake of Diefenbaker had a profound effect on bilateral Diefenbaker's adjustment of his policy towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons was intrinsically tied to his relationship with the sitting U.S. president. When he had a friendship with the president, as he did with Eisenhower, he maintained an interest and even concern about the continuation of the Bomarc program. In contrast, when the U.S. president failed to soothe his fears and aggravated him, as with Kennedy, he stalled the Bomarc program. His attitude towards the acquisition of the Bomarc missiles then affected bilateral relations between the two countries.
As such, Diefenbaker's relationships with the respective U.S. presidents demonstrate how relationships between national leaders have the ability to dramatically influence both shared defense policies and bilateral relations.
